










THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association
Vol. 86, No. 2 DOI: 10.2308/accr.00000024
2011
pp. 703–733Stock Repurchases and Executive
Compensation Contract Design:The Role of
Earnings per Share PerformanceConditions
Steven Young
Lancaster University Management School
Jing Yang
Towers Perrin
ABSTRACT: We examine the link between firms’ stock repurchase activity and the
presence of earnings per share EPS performance conditions in executive compensa-
tion contracts. Findings reveal a strong positive association between repurchases and
EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Further analysis suggests net benefits to
shareholders from this association. Specifically, repurchasers experience larger in-
creases in total payouts; the positive association between repurchases and cash per-
formance is more pronounced for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus
cash; undervalued firms with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a
repurchase; and repurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal
accruals. We find no evidence that EPS-driven repurchases impose costs on share-
holders in the form of investment myopia.
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his study investigates the link between firms’ stock repurchase activity and the presence of
earnings per share performance conditions in executive compensation contracts. Our analy-
sis seeks to address the apparent disconnect between theory and practice regarding repur-
hases. One the one hand, traditional academic theories identify factors such as signaling
Vermaelen 1981, agency costs Fenn and Liang 2001, and leverage Dittmar 2000 as important
eterminants of repurchase activity. On the other hand, survey and anecdotal evidence highlight
arnings per share EPS as a key factor influencing managers’ repurchase decisions Badrinath
nd Varaiya 2000; Brav et al. 2005; Caster et al. 2006. Exploring why managers attach such
eight to the EPS impact of repurchases represents an important step toward a better understand-
ng of this increasingly significant aspect of payout policy.
Recent research sheds light on the links between repurchase decisions and EPS-related con-
iderations. Kahle 2002, Bens et al. 2002, and Bens et al. 2003 focus on the dilutive impact
f employee stock options ESOs. Their findings suggest repurchases are a managerial response
o EPS dilution concerns. Evidence also suggests that managers use repurchases for benchmark-
eating purposes, including meeting or exceeding analysts’ EPS forecasts Hribar et al. 2006,
reserving a sequence of EPS improvement Myers et al. 2007, and maintaining historic EPS
rowth rates Bens et al. 2003.
Our analysis builds on prior research by examining whether managers’ stock repurchase
ecisions are sensitive to explicit EPS-related incentives provided by executive compensation
ontracts. Compensation contracts linking rewards to EPS performance provide executives with
irect and potentially powerful incentives to manage reported EPS. We therefore test whether
epurchase activity is higher for firms with executive compensation tied to EPS performance.
Empirical tests employ data for a comprehensive sample of U.K. nonfinancial firms over the
eriod January 1998 through December 2006. Several features make the U.K. a particularly
ttractive setting in which to explore the link between repurchases and compensation contract
esign. First, in addition to executive bonus plans that routinely condition rewards on EPS per-
ormance, executives’ long-term incentives including options and restricted stock frequently em-
loy EPS vesting conditions Conyon et al. 2000; Carter et al. 2009. Second, regulatory restric-
ions governing the treatment of repurchases during the majority of our sample period help
implify empirical tests by tempering the link between repurchase activity and the dilutive effects
f ESOs. In particular, U.K. Company Law required repurchased shares to be cancelled immedi-
tely rendering repurchases a costly device for offsetting ESO-related EPS dilution because
ssuing new shares is administratively more costly than reissuing treasury stock. Instead, U.K.
rms with ESO programs typically established a wholly owned trust company to repurchase and
eissue shares on their behalf. Under U.K. GAAP, shares held by ESO trusts are excluded from
he EPS calculation until shares vest unconditionally. Since ESO shares are purchased solely to
und share-based compensation plans and because ESO purchases do not meet the legal definition
f a stock repurchase, our tests can distinguish between repurchases driven by dilution concerns
ESO shares and repurchases driven by other factors.1
Findings reveal a significant association between repurchase activity and the presence of
PS-based compensation arrangements. The predicted odds of a repurchase for firms for which
U.K. Company Law was amended in December 2003 to allow firms to hold repurchased shares as treasury stock.
Consistent with the absence of ESO-related motives for repurchases, none of our sample firms mentioned the dilutive
impact of stock-based compensation plans among the list of repurchase reasons disclosed in their annual reports prior to
this date. Following the regime switch, most U.K. firms continue to cancel repurchased shares. As described in Section
III, we exclude from our subsequent empirical tests firms that explicitly repurchase stock into treasury post-December
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Txecutive compensation depends on EPS performance are almost twice the level observed for
rms for which rewards are independent of EPS. EPS conditions in bonus and option plans are
ssociated with incrementally significant effects. Our findings suggest that EPS performance con-
itions represent an important determinant of U.K. managers’ stock repurchase decisions.
An important ancillary question raised by our findings is how the link between repurchases
nd executive compensation arrangements impacts shareholder value. We explore this issue by
xamining the costs and benefits associated with compensation-driven repurchases. On balance,
ur evidence suggests that EPS-driven repurchases yield net benefits to shareholders. First, repur-
hasers make higher aggregate payouts to shareholders regardless of the performance conditions
mployed in executive compensation contracts, and we find no evidence that EPS-driven repur-
hase payouts occur at the expense of either investment myopia Bens et al. 2002 or dividend
ubstitution Grullon and Michaely 2002. Second, tests reveal several contracting benefits from
epurchase incentives caused by linking compensation to EPS performance, including a stronger
ssociation between cash performance and repurchases in the presence of surplus cash, a higher
ropensity to signal undervaluation through a repurchase when stock price falls below intrinsic
alue, and lower accrual manipulation.
Our study contributes to prior research in several ways. First, while extant work links repur-
hases to the dilutive impact of employee option plans Kahle 2002; Bens et al. 2002; Bens et al.
003, and EPS-based bonus plans to the dilutive impact of new equity issues Huang et al. 2010,
he association between repurchase activity and EPS-contingent compensation has attracted little
ttention. Our study highlights EPS-based executive compensation contracts as an important de-
erminant of repurchase activity that is entirely consistent with the EPS benefits of buybacks
requently highlighted by management Badrinath and Varaiya 2000; Brav et al. 2005; Caster et al.
006. Our findings complement and extend Marquardt et al.’s 2009 evidence that EPS-based
onus plans explain managers’ preference for accelerated stock repurchases over regular open
arket buybacks. We add to their findings by demonstrating that EPS-based compensation ar-
angements also explain the underlying decision to repurchase stock and that shareholders benefit
rom this relation. Second, our analysis relates to work on performance measure choice in com-
ensation contracts. In particular, prior research emphasizes how EPS targets encourage overin-
estment Brealey et al. 2008, 889. Our results provide a counterbalance to this view by high-
ighting how the repurchase incentives created by EPS-contingent pay help align managers’
nterests with those of shareholders. Our conclusion is consistent with Huang et al. 2010 who
odel the use of EPS conditions in executive bonus plans and find that EPS-contingent compen-
ation helps resolve agency problems by protecting current shareholders from a reduction in
roportional ownership. Our analysis also contributes to the small body of research exploring the
nteraction between alternative earnings management instruments e.g., Demski et al. 2004; Cohen
t al. 2008. We argue that shareholders gain when managers manipulate EPS through repurchases
ather than accounting accruals, and we show that the incentive created by EPS targets to manipu-
ate via repurchases correlates with less accrual management.
Section II develops the link between repurchases and executive compensation arrangements,
nd reviews the structure of executive compensation plans in the U.K. Section III provides details
f our sample, data, and research design. Section IV reports results of tests that examine the
ssociation between repurchases and EPS-based performance targets in executive compensation
lans. Section V explores the implications for shareholders of repurchases motivated by EPS-








































AII. LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW
tock Repurchases, Earnings Management, and Executive Compensation
Despite being overlooked in much of the corporate payout policy literature, managers and
nancial commentators have long recognized the EPS implications of stock repurchases. The
mpact of repurchases on reported EPS represents the net of both numerator and denominator
ffects. The numerator effect, which works to reduce EPS, represents the decline in earnings
aused by an increase in borrowing for repurchases financed with debt or a reduction in invest-
ent returns for repurchases financed using cash reserves. The denominator effect serves to
ncrease EPS by reducing the number of shares outstanding. Repurchases have a positive net effect
n EPS for firms whose earnings-to-price ratio exceeds the opportunity cost of funds i.e., either
he after-tax return on short-term cash investments or the cost of debt; Guay 2002; Bens et al.
003; Hribar et al. 2006. Survey evidence reported by Brav et al. 2005 highlights the central
ole EPS considerations play in shaping managers’ repurchase decisions, with three-quarters of
enior executives citing EPS growth as an important factor affecting their repurchase decisions.
Research has begun to explore the link between repurchases and EPS in several contexts. One
PS-related factor predicted to motivate repurchases is earnings dilution caused by ESO plans.
ccretive stock repurchases can offset the dilutive effects of ESOs on reported EPS in several
ays. For example, while ESO exercises reduce basic EPS by increasing the weighted average
umber of shares outstanding for the period, managers can mitigate this dilution by repurchasing
hares to fund option exercises. Bens et al. 2002 and Kahle 2002 present evidence consistent
ith this option-funding hypothesis. Conversely, Bens et al. 2003 conclude that repurchases are
ot a response to the dilutive impact of option exercises on basic EPS. Instead, their results
uggest the link between repurchases and options is driven by the effect of ESOs on diluted EPS,
ith buybacks increasing in the level of in-the-money ESOs outstanding.
Repurchases motivated by EPS considerations have also been linked with benchmark-beating
arnings management activity. Controlling for dilution effects, Bens et al. 2003 find that repur-
hases are increasing in the amount by which earnings undershoot the level required to sustain
istorical diluted EPS growth. Myers et al. 2007 document similar behavior in a sample of firms
haracterized by long strings of consecutive quarterly EPS increases, with managers strategically
iming repurchases to boost reported EPS when the string would otherwise be broken. Meanwhile,
ribar et al. 2006 conclude that managers use repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ consensus
PS forecasts. In all these studies, benchmark-beating stock repurchase activity is motivated
hrough implicit managerial incentives in the form of higher stock-related compensation, greater
ob security, and a lower cost of capital.2
Compensation contracts represent a powerful source of incentives for managers. For example,
esearch demonstrates that executives use their accounting discretion to manipulate earnings in
esponse to compensation-driven considerations Bushman and Smith 2001. Further, a growing
ody of evidence suggests that corporate payout decisions are sensitive to executives’ compensa-
ion arrangements. For instance, firms for which the executives’ annual bonus pool is contingent
n dividends paid are associated with higher dividend payouts and yields White 1996, while
SOs that are not dividend-protected create incentives for executives to reduce dividend payments
Bens et al. 2003, 75–76 argue that explicit compensation contract considerations are not the source of their findings
linking repurchases to EPS manipulation. They estimate firm-specific correlations between CEO cash compensation and
reported EPS and use the median correlation to divide firms into high and low cash compensation-EPS sensitivity firms.
Tests reveal no evidence that their main results differ across the two subsamples. However, this approach is unlikely to
provide a powerful means of distinguishing firms with explicit EPS targets from those using alternative earnings-based
performance metrics. Further, since the approach focuses exclusively on cash compensation, it ignores the impact of
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TLambert et al. 1989; Kahle 2002; Fenn and Liang 2001. In related research, Aboody and Kasznik
2008 demonstrate how compensation plan design can help align managers’ cash payout decisions
ith shareholders’ tax-driven payout preferences. Finally, Wallace 1997 and Marquardt et al.
2009 examine the link between bonus plan performance conditions and corporate payout policy.
sing a sample of firms adopting residual income-based plans which penalize managers for
ccumulating capital that earns less than the opportunity cost of capital, Wallace 1997 docu-
ents a post-adoption rise in repurchase activity as managers liquidate unproductive assets.
arquardt et al. 2009, meanwhile, provide direct evidence on the link between EPS performance
onditions and stock repurchase activity. Specifically, they find that managers are more likely to
avor accelerated stock repurchases which record the full EPS benefits of the repurchase imme-
iately over regular open market repurchases when their bonus plans are explicitly tied to EPS
erformance. However, the extent to which EPS-based compensation arrangements explain the
ropensity to repurchase more generally remains unexplored.
EPS is a popular performance metric used in executive compensation contracts Murphy
999; Conyon et al. 2000; Pass et al. 2000. Compensation contracts that tie managerial rewards
o EPS create explicit incentives for executives to manage the EPS denominator through repur-
hases over and above any implicit market-based incentives associated with increasing stock-
ased wealth and improving job security. These direct incentives are absent in compensation
ontracts that employ non-per-share-based earnings metrics such as return on assets, and nonac-
ounting measures such as stock price or qualitative targets linked to personal objectives. Accord-
ngly, we predict that stock repurchase activity will be positively associated with the incidence of
PS-based performance conditions in executive compensation contracts. We test this prediction in
he U.K. where short- and long-term elements of executive pay are linked to EPS Conyon et al.
000; Pass et al. 2000; Carter et al. 2009.
verview of Executive Compensation Arrangements in the U.K.
The typical compensation package for a U.K. executive director includes both short-term
onus arrangements and longer-term incentives such as options and restricted stock Conyon and
urphy 2000. Bonus payments are normally linked to short-term performance measures and
bjectives. In addition, U.K. firms regularly impose performance-vesting conditions in executives’
ong-term stock- and cash-based plans. Widespread adoption of performance-vesting conditions in
xecutives’ long-term compensation plans can be traced to the Greenbury Report 1995, which
roposed that all long-term incentives including option plans should include challenging perfor-
ance criteria. After December 31, 1995, revised London Stock Exchange rules required all listed
rms to either comply with the Greenbury recommendation or publish a statement explaining
oncompliance. Further pressure to adopt performance conditions for long-term incentives was
pplied by influential shareholder groups including the Association of British Insurers and the
ational Association of Pension Funds. As a result, performance vesting conditions in long-term
lans are now commonplace among U.K. firms Carter et al. 2009.
While best practice compensation guidelines do not favor any single performance metric,
urvey evidence reveals widespread adoption of EPS-based targets. For example, Conyon et al.
2000 report that 72 percent of option plans with performance-contingent vesting conditions
efine targets in terms of EPS growth, while Pass et al. 2000 find that 34 percent of long-term
ncentive plans LTIPs surveyed had an EPS performance condition. Accordingly, the perfor-
ance conditions applied in long-term compensation arrangements often mirror those used in
hort-term bonus plans, for which EPS targets have long been used. The widespread use of EPS
argets in executive compensation arrangements is expected to create powerful incentives for U.K.









































AIII. DATA AND METHODS
ample and Data
The initial sampling frame comprises all U.K.-resident firms excluding closed-end invest-
ent trusts listed on the London Stock Exchange LSE with fiscal year-ends between January 1,
998 and December 31, 2006. The sample period starts in 1998 because executive compensation
ata are collected with a one-year lag and disclosures relating to performance conditions in
xecutive compensation contracts are patchy before 1997.
Firm-level repurchase data relate to aggregate reacquisitions made during a fiscal year. Only
epurchases executed in the open market or via self-tender offer are used in subsequent tests. We
and-collect annual repurchase data from firms’ published financial statements. This process in-
olves identifying potential repurchasers using a variety of news sources including the London
tock Exchange Regulatory News Service, the Securities Data Corporation, and The Financial
imes. Financial statements with year-ends between January 1998 and December 2006 are then
xamined for all firms in the provisional list to identify the number, value, and fraction of shares
epurchased. The resulting sample comprises 1,047 repurchase firm-year observations for 460
rms. We remove financial firms due to the unique nature of performance measurement in that
ector. Utility firms are also removed due to a lack of nonrepurchasing firms in the same sector for
atching purposes see below. A further 67 observations are lost due to missing data required to
onstruct one or more of our test variables. We also exclude ten treasury stock repurchase obser-
ations driven entirely by outstanding option commitments. The final sample consists of 665
epurchase firm-years.
Repurchasing firms are drawn from 31 Datastream level-4 nonfinancial industry groups, with
o single industry accounting for more than 12 percent of the final sample. The aggregate value of
hares reacquired during the sample window exceeds £83 billion, with an average median annual
epurchase value of £124.9 million £3.9 million. Repurchase activity in the U.K. is increasing
ver time, with the aggregate amount rising from £636 million in 1998 to almost £28 billion in
006. The average median annual repurchase involves approximately 5 3 percent of common
hares outstanding. Repurchased shares are cancelled in the majority of cases: only 66 observa-
ions 10 percent utilize the treasury stock option.
Empirical tests require details of performance conditions used in executive compensation
ontracts, data for which are also hand-collected from firms’ published annual reports and financial
tatements. Collecting such data for all LSE-listed nonrepurchase firms is infeasible. We therefore
mploy a case-control matched sample design whereby each of the 665 repurchase firm-year
bservations is paired with a time-, industry- and size-matched nonrepurchasing firm.3 Matching
y industry Datastream level-4 helps control for factors that are expected to affect payout policy
Smith and Watts 1992 and compensation arrangements Antle and Smith 1986, while matching
y size lagged total assets helps to control for established associations between firm size and
epurchase activity Dittmar 2000; Jagannathan et al. 2000, and between firm size and compen-
ation arrangements Pass et al. 2000. Nonrepurchase control firms are matched with repurchasers
t the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the repurchase year. Nonrepurchasers must not have
mplemented a buyback at any point prior to the matching year or during the subsequent four-year
eriod.
Case-control matching unavoidably leads to disproportionate random sampling on the dependent variable. However,
subsequent tests linking repurchase activity to EPS-based performance conditions in executive compensation contacts
employ logistic regression, a well-known property of which is that slope coefficients remain unbiased in the presence of
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TDetails of the following performance-related elements of executive compensation are col-
ected from repurchase and nonrepurchase firms’ annual reports in the matching year: short-term
onus plans, option plans, and long-term incentive plans. Bonus plans comprise all arrangements
or which rewards are tied to short-term ≤one-year performance targets. Option plans comprise
ll stock-based arrangements granting executives the right to acquire shares at a nonzero exercise
rice. Firm-wide employee option plans and save-as-you-earn schemes are excluded. LTIPs
onsist of all remaining long-term compensation arrangements not classified as options e.g.,
eferred bonus schemes, share matching schemes, zero strike price options, stock appreciation
ights, long-term cash-based bonus plans, etc.. We record the performance conditions for all
ctive plans in each category. The data-collection process has to confront two disclosure problems.
irst, a handful of firms fail to unambiguously disclose use of one or more of the three plan types.
econd, some firms fail to provide details of the performance conditions used in one or more of
heir plans. We use previous years’ Annual General Meeting resolutions and remuneration disclo-
ures up to two years ahead to verify plan existence and determine performance conditions
mployed.4 Cases for which we cannot unambiguously determine plan existence or the use of an
PS performance condition are coded as nondisclosers.
esearch Design
We expect EPS performance conditions to be more prevalent among repurchasing firms. We
est this prediction using a conditional logistic regression to model the probability of a repurchase
nd a left-censored tobit regression to model the value of repurchases:
Log pit1 − pit = 1NDISCijt−1 + 2EPSijt−1 + k=1
K
kControlskit−1, 1
Repit = 0 + 1NDISCijt−1 + 2EPSijt−1 + 
k=1
K
kControlskit−1 + it. 2
or the conditional logistic model presented in Equation 1, pit is the latent probability that firm
repurchases shares in year t yit = 1. The conditional logistic model is the appropriate estimation
ethod for the matched pair structure of our data Allison 1999, 203.5 For the left-censored tobit
odel presented in Equation 2, Rep is the observed value of the latent propensity to repurchase
tock Rep*: Repit = 0 if Repit
* 0 and Repit = value of stock repurchases in fiscal year t scaled by
agged total assets if Repit
* 0.
The vector of explanatory variables is the same in Equations 1 and 2: NDISC is an
ndicator variable taking the value of 1 if the presence of an EPS performance condition is
ndeterminate for at least one of the j compensation components j  bonus plans, stock option
lans, and LTIPs, and 0 otherwise; EPS is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if an EPS
erformance condition is used in at least one of the j compensation components, and 0 otherwise;
nd Controls is a vector of K additional factors expected to influence the repurchase decision.6 The
Compensation disclosures in the U.K. improved dramatically during the late 1990s and early 2000s. When using one-
and two-period-ahead remuneration disclosures, we are careful to distinguish between established plans and new plans
introduced subsequently.
We also estimated Equation 1 using a pooled unmatched logistic model with very similar results. Results are
available from the authors on request.
Incomplete disclosure of performance conditions means that EPS realizations may take one of three forms: EPS
condition is used and disclosed; EPS condition is unambiguously not used; and EPS condition is indeterminate due to
insufficient disclosure. Defining EPS in Equations 1 and 2 as a three-way categorical variable imposes a linearity










































Aet of control variables includes the market-to-book ratio, net leverage, dividend yield, prior-
eriod abnormal stock price performance, and firm size Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Dittmar
000; Grullon and Michaely 2002. Since repurchases have a positive net effect on EPS when a
rm’s earnings-to-price E/P ratio exceeds its opportunity cost of funds, only firms that meet such
condition will repurchase shares to boost EPS. We therefore include an indicator variable for
rms reporting negative earnings on the grounds that the E/P condition is least likely to hold in
uch cases. Prior research documents a link between ESO plans and stock repurchases by U.S.
rms Fenn and Liang 2001; Dittmar 2000. Although U.K. regulatory rules governing stock
epurchases militate against such behavior during our sample period, for completeness we include
he total number of options outstanding for all employees scaled by market capitalization as an
dditional control variable. To ensure that our analysis is capturing effects unique to EPS, we also
ontrol for the presence of earnings-based performance conditions of any description.7 Finally,
e control for the well-established link between repurchases and surplus cash Stephens and
eisbach 1998; Dittmar 2000; Guay and Harford 2000; Jagannathan et al. 2000. The presence of
urplus cash is captured using both stock surplus cash holdings and flow excess cash flow
easures. Our measure of surplus cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents in excess of the level
equired for normal operations and investments. Following Opler et al. 1999, we estimate surplus
ash holdings as the residual from an OLS regression of cash holdings scaled by lagged noncash
ssets on a vector of explanatory variables comprising the market-to-book ratio, net working
apital scaled by lagged total assets, lagged operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets,
et leverage, R&D spending scaled by total revenue, the natural logarithm of market capitaliza-
ion, an indicator variable for nonzero dividend payments, and industry fixed effects. The regres-
ion is estimated annually using all Extel nonfinancial firms with complete data after excluding the
op and bottom percentiles of scaled cash holdings. We extract the residuals 	it from the annual
stimations to construct an indicator variable equal to 1 when 	it  0, and 0 otherwise.
We use two measures of excess cash flow, one based on operating activities Free cash flow
nd one based on nonoperating activities Excess investing cash flow. Following Opler and
itman 1993 and Fenn and Liang 2001, Free cash flow is an indicator variable equal to 1 for
rms with a market-to-book ratio less than the Extel annual sample median and operating cash
ow scaled by lagged total assets greater than the Extel annual sample median, and 0 otherwise.
xcess investing cash flow is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when net cash inflow from
nvesting activities is positive, and 0 otherwise. Investing cash inflows result from the sale of
xed and intangible assets, associates and other investments, and subsidiaries. All explanatory
ariables in Equations 1 and 2 are measured at the start of the repurchase year.
IV. RESULTS
escriptive Statistics
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the incidence of bonus plans, option plans,
nd LTIPs. Frequency counts reported in columns 2–4 reveal most firms operate at least one bonus
lan and one option plan, whereas only 40 percent of firms have an active LTIP. Cross-sample
omparisons indicate that repurchasers are marginally more likely to operate a bonus plan
p  0.09. Consistent with the absence of powerful ESO-related motives for stock repurchases in
dummy variables and then use two of these in place of the original variable Allison 1999, 128–130. Tests reveal that
imposing the linearity constraint on our data leads to a reduction in model fit the change in the likelihood ratio statistic
is significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that the unconstrained formulation presented in Equations 1 and 2 is more
appropriate in our case.
For example, residual income also creates incentives to distribute capital earning less than the opportunity cost of funds
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TTABLE 1
Summary Statistics and Features of Compensation Plan Components for Repurchaser and
Nonrepurchaser Matched Pairs
anel A: Frequency of Plans
ompensation
omponent
Plan Status by Firm Number of Plans
≥1 Plan No Plan
Not
Disclosed n Mean Std. Dev. Median Max
onus Plans
Repurchasers 601 49 15 605 0.931 0.277 1 2
Nonrepurchasers 596 68 1 600 0.904 0.315 1 2
p-value for difference 0.09 0.17 0.17
ption Plans
Repurchasers 591 69 5 759 1.150 0.621 1 3
Nonrepurchasers 601 64 0 789 1.186 0.620 1 3
p-value for difference 0.62 0.29 0.31
ong-Term Incentive Plans
Repurchasers 282 377 6 377 0.572 0.745 0 3
Nonrepurchasers 287 378 0 373 0.561 0.744 0 3
p-value for difference 0.89 0.77 0.74





n % n %
onus Plans
Earnings per share 168 27.8 121 20.2
Profit before tax/EBIT/Operating profit 303 50.1 329 54.8
Residual income 15 2.5 7 1.2
Return on capital 21 3.5 34 5.7
Share price/Total shareholder return 16 2.6 16 2.7
Personal objectives 88 14.5 118 19.7
Other 198 32.7 252 42.0
Not disclosed 153 25.3 122 20.3
Total Number of Plans 605 600
ption Plans
Earnings per share 488 64.3 398 50.4
Profit before tax/EBIT/Operating profit 24 3.2 15 1.9
Return on capital 4 0.5 1 0.1
Share price/Total shareholder return 62 8.2 125 15.8
Personal objectives 0 0.0 1 0.1
Other 8 1.1 12 1.5
No performance condition 176 23.2 238 30.2
Not disclosed 27 3.6 9 1.1
Total Number of Plans 759 789
ong-Term Incentive Plans
Earnings per share 155 41.1 151 40.5
Profit before tax/EBIT/Operating profit 13 3.4 17 4.6







































Ahe U.K., the frequency of firms with at least one option plan is equivalent in the two samples, as
s the incidence of LTIPs. The final three columns in Panel A report summary statistics for the
umber of active plans. No significant differences are apparent between the two samples.
Plan-level details of performance conditions are reported in Table 1, Panel B. For bonus plans,
8 percent of the 605 plans operated by repurchasers have EPS performance conditions, as com-
ared to only 20 percent of 600 comparable plans operated by nonrepurchasers. In contrast,
ggregate profit-based metrics such as profit before tax, personal objectives, and other measures
e.g., operations metrics, KPIs are more common among nonrepurchasers. Note also that repur-
hase firms are characterized by poorer disclosure of bonus-related performance conditions: 25
ercent of plans in the repurchase sample contain no details of performance conditions, as com-
ared to only 20 percent of plans in the nonrepurchase sample. Similar patterns are apparent for
ption plans. Option exercise is conditional on EPS performance in 64 percent of repurchase
rms’ plans, as compared to 50 percent of plans in the nonrepurchase sample. Results for bonus
nd option plans provide preliminary evidence that repurchase activity is increasing in the pres-
nce of EPS performance conditions. No difference in the use of EPS conditions exists for LTIPs;
oughly 40 percent of plans in both samples are conditional on EPS performance.
Summary statistics for our main test variables are reported in Table 2. Seventy-one percent of
epurchasers have at least one plan linking at least one element of executive compensation to EPS.
he comparable figure for nonrepurchasers is 60 percent, which is significantly lower based on a
aired Wilcoxon test p 
 0.01. Analyzing the incidence of EPS targets for each compensation
lement separately reveals that repurchasers are significantly more likely to have at least one
onus plan and at least one option plan tied to EPS. In contrast, repurchase and nonrepurchase
rms are equally likely to have an LTIP conditional on EPS. Significant differences across repur-





n % n %
Residual income 6 1.6 2 0.5
Return on capital 10 2.7 13 3.5
Share price/Total shareholder return 217 57.6 196 52.5
Other 14 3.7 17 4.6
No performance condition 52 13.8 43 11.5
Not disclosed 1 0.3 3 0.8
Total Number of Plans 377 373
he sample comprises 665 fiscal years between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2006 in which firms repurchased shares
nd 665 nonrepurchase firm-years matched by fiscal year, industry, and lagged total assets.
ll compensation data relate to compensation contracts for executive directors. Data are collected on all plans for the
ollowing three elements in executives’ compensation contracts: bonuses, share options, and long-term incentives. Bonus
lans comprise all arrangements where rewards are tied to short-term ≤one-year performance targets. Option plans
onsist of incentive contracts granting executives the right to acquire their firm’s shares a non-zero exercise price. Firm-
ide employee share option plans and save-as-you-earn schemes are not included. Long-term incentive plans LTIPs
onsist of all remaining long-term compensation arrangements not classified as options. Probability values reported in
anel A are for Chi-square tests column 2, paired t-tests column 6, and paired Wilcoxon tests column 8.
or each compensation component, the sum of performance measure percentages reported in Panel B may exceed 100
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TTABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Repurchase Sample (n  665)
Mean Std. Dev. Max Q3 Median Q1 Min
ompensation Variables
EPS 0.71 0.46 1 1 1 0 0
NDISC 0.14 0.35 1 0 0 0 0
EPSBonus 0.25 0.43 1 1 0 0 0
NDISCBonus 0.24 0.43 1 0 0 0 0
EPSOption 0.62 0.49 1 1 1 0 0
NDISCOption 0.05 0.21 1 0 0 0 0
EPSLTIP 0.20 0.40 1 0 0 0 0
NDISCLTIP 0.01 0.09 1 0 0 0 0
ontrol Variables
Surplus cash holdings 0.69 0.46 1 1 1 0 0
Free cash flow 0.32 0.47 1 1 0 0 0
Excess investing cash flow 0.19 0.39 1 0 0 0 0
Log(market capitalization) 5.29 2.43 11.71 6.96 5.05 3.30 0.21
Market-to-book 1.61 0.96 6.29 1.88 1.31 1.00 0.44
Net leverage 0.15 1.54 0.84 0.19 0.05 0.15 24.61
Dividend yield 0.04 0.07 1.42 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.00
Negative returns 0.56 0.50 1 1 1 0 0
Negative earnings 0.10 0.30 1 0 0 0 0
Options outstanding 0.76 18.38 47.91 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
Nonrepurchase Sample (n  665)
p-value for
DifferenceMean Std. Dev. Max Q3 Median Q1 Min
ompensation Variables
EPS 0.60 0.49 1 1 1 0 0 0.01
NDISC 0.09 0.29 1 0 0 0 0 0.01
EPSBonus 0.18 0.39 1 0 0 0 0 0.01
NDISCBonus 0.18 0.38 1 0 0 0 0 0.01
EPSOption 0.50 0.50 1 1 1 0 0 0.01
NDISCOption 0.01 0.10 1 0 0 0 0 0.01
EPSLTIP 0.19 0.40 1 0 0 0 0 0.61
NDISCLTIP 0.01 0.08 1 0 0 0 0 0.75
ontrol Variables
Surplus cash holdings 0.65 0.48 1 1 1 0 0 0.09
Free cash flow 0.29 0.45 1 1 0 0 0 0.16
Excess investing cash flow 0.14 0.35 1 0 0 0 0 0.02
Log(market capitalization) 4.72 1.91 10.74 6.06 4.73 3.20 0.88 0.01
Market-to-book 1.63 1.61 29.69 1.69 1.25 1.00 0.41 0.01
Net leverage 0.03 0.88 1.87 0.29 0.15 0.02 10.69 0.01
Dividend yield 0.03 0.09 1.46 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
Negative returns 0.61 0.49 1 1 1 0 0 0.01
Negative earnings 0.28 0.45 1 1 0 0 0 0.01
Options outstanding 0.16 0.77 11.24 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01(continued on next page)








Ahase and control samples are apparent for almost all control variables. Consistent with prior
esearch, repurchasers have more surplus cash, lower net leverage, and are larger than their
onrepurchaser counterparts.
ll variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase year. The “p-value for Difference” column reports probability
alues for two-tailed paired Wilcoxon Sign Rank tests of the difference between repurchase and nonrepurchase firms.
Variable Definitions with Extel codes in square brackets where applicable:
NDISC  indicator variable taking the value of 1 when insufficient disclosure renders the presence
of an EPS target indeterminate, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one bonus plan, option plan,
or LTIP tied to EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
NDISCBonus  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms that fail to explicitly disclose whether
bonus payments are conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
EPSBonus  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms where bonus payments are fully or
partially conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
NDISCOption  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms that fail to explicitly disclose whether
option vesting is conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
EPSOption  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms where option vesting is fully or partially
conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
NDISCLTIP  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms that fail to explicitly disclose whether
LTIP rewards are conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
EPSLTIP  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms where LTIP rewards are fully or partially
conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
Surplus cash holdings  indicator variable based on the residual from yearly OLS regressions of the natural
logarithm of cash holdings cash and cash equivalents ex.CurrentAssetsCashAndNearCash
 ex.CurrentAssetsCurrentInvestments scaled by lagged total assets ex.TotalAssets
net of cash and cash equivalents on the natural logarithm of market capitalization
ex.MarketCapitalization, operating cash flow ex.CFOperatingInflows scaled by lagged
total assets, net working capital noncash current assets ex.CurrentAssets 
ex.CurrentAssetsCashAndNearCash  ex.CurrentAssetsCurrentInvestments  current
liabilities ex.Creditors  ex.DebtSTLoans divided by total assets net of cash and cash
equivalents, net leverage total liabilities ex.DebtLTLoans  ex.DebtSTLoans net
of cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets net of cash and cash equivalents,
research and development ex.TradingExpResearchAndDevelopment divided by total
revenue ex.Sales, the market-to-book ratio book value of debt ex.TotalAssets 
ex.ShareholdersEquityOwnEquShares  ex. ShareholdersEquityOwnSharePrem 
ex.ShareholdersEquityPreferShares  ex.ShareholdersEquityParticipShares plus the
market value of equity divided by total assets, and dividend payout an indicator variable
taking the value of 1 for firms with non-zero ordinary dividends per share
ex.DividendsPerShareNetReported, and 0 otherwise; Surplus cash holdings indicator
variable takes the value of 1 where the regression residual is positive, and 0 otherwise;
Free cash flow  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the
entire Extel annual sample median and net operating cash flow scaled by lagged total
assets greater than the entire Extel annual sample median, and 0 otherwise;
Excess investing cash flow  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if investing cash flows ex.CFInvestments are
positive, and 0 otherwise;
Market capitalization  fiscal year-end share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;
Market-to-book  book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets;
Net leverage  total liabilities net of cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets net of cash and
cash equivalents;
Dividend yield  ordinary dividends per share divided by share price;
Negative returns  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 12-month stock returns are less than the market
return over the corresponding period, and 0 otherwise;
Negative earnings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if earnings per share ex.EPSAsReported is
negative, and 0 otherwise; and
Options outstanding  aggregate number of outstanding options for all employees at the balance sheet date
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Togistic and Tobit Regressions
Coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for conditional logistic regressions relat-
ng the probability of a repurchase to the incidence of EPS-based performance conditions are
eported in Table 3, Models 1–3. Results for comparable left-censored tobit regressions are re-
orted in Models 4–5. EPS in Model 1 equals 1 when at least one plan of any type links executive
ompensation to EPS, and 0 otherwise. As predicted, the estimated coefficient on EPS is positive
nd significant. EPS performance conditions also represent an economically important driver of
epurchase activity; the predicted odds of a repurchase for firms where executive compensation
epends on EPS performance are almost twice the odds for firms where payouts are independent
f EPS. Note also that the odds ratio for EPS in Model 1 is similar to and in many cases larger
han the odds ratios associated with traditional determinants of repurchase activity such as excess
ash flow and low leverage.
Model 1 also reveals that repurchasers are less likely to disclose details of performance
onditions used in executive compensation contracts. The estimated coefficient on NDISC is
ositive and highly significant, while the odds ratio is large relative to other variables. We have no
redictions concerning the link between repurchase activity and the transparency with which firms
isclose details of compensation arrangements. To ensure that nondiscloser cases are not con-
ounding the analysis, we re-estimated Model 1 after removing such cases. Results reported in
odel 2 are entirely consistent with those in Model 1. Whatever effect NDISC may be capturing,
t appears to be distinct from our main prediction.
Of the remaining control variables in Models 1 and 2, coefficient estimates on Free cash flow,
xcess investing cash flow, Market-to-book, Net leverage, and Negative earnings are statistically
ignificant and of the predicted sign. In addition, even after controlling for differences in lagged
otal assets via our matching procedure, repurchasers are characterized by higher market capitali-
ation at the beginning of the repurchase year.
Model 3 in Table 3 provides evidence on the incremental effects of EPS-based bonus, option,
nd LTIP arrangements. EPS-based bonus and option plans are associated with incremental posi-
ive effects of similar magnitude. In contrast, EPS-based LTIPs have no discernable effect on
epurchase activity. The absence of an LTIP effect likely reflects the lower incidence of such plans
elative to bonus and option plans see Table 1, Panel A, coupled with the dominance of total
hareholder return TSR performance conditions in these plans.8
Models 4 and 5 in Table 3 are for left-censored tobit regressions modeling the scaled value of
epurchases. Findings replicate those for the conditional logistic models. Even after controlling for
raditional determinants of repurchases, annual spending on buybacks is positively associated with
PS and the marginal effect for this variable is similar to and in many cases larger than the effect
or more established drivers of repurchase activity. Consistent with the logistic results, while the
oefficient on NDISC is positive and highly significant in Model 4, exclusion of nondisclosing
atched pairs Model 5 does not affect the EPS coefficient estimate. Collectively, results reported
Although many firms employ EPS targets in their LTIPs, these are often combined with and subordinate to a TSR
condition. For example, awards under KBC Advanced Technologies’ share-based LTIP require minimum TSR over a
three-year period equal to the median for the FTSE Small Cap Index over the same period, with maximum awards for
TSR at or above 75th percentile ranking. Irrespective of TSR performance, awards are conditional on real EPS growth




















Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics for Conditional Logistic
(Left-Censored Tobit) Regressions Relating the Probability (Scaled Value) of a Repurchase





Logistic Models Tobit Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
urplus cash holdings  0.20 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.02
1.22 1.27 1.27 0.00 0.00
0.18 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.02
ree cash flow  0.69 0.60 0.66 0.00 0.00
2.00 1.83 1.93 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.77
xcess investing cash flow  0.71 0.86 0.75 0.02 0.03
2.03 2.40 2.11 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
og(market capitalization) ? 1.27 1.51 1.22 0.00 0.00
3.56 4.52 3.39 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
arket-to-book  0.72 0.81 0.68 0.01 0.01
0.49 0.45 0.51 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
et leverage  0.43 0.46 0.43 0.01 0.01
0.65 0.63 0.65 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ividend yield ? 1.18 1.34 1.15 0.01 0.00
3.25 3.82 3.15 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.17 0.23 0.80 0.93
egative returns  0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.95 0.94 0.97 0.00 0.00
0.73 0.73 0.84 0.99 0.98
egative earnings  1.22 1.38 1.14 0.05 0.06
0.30 0.25 0.32 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ptions outstanding  0.021 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.98 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.07
arnings-based target ? 0.15 0.22 0.06 0.01 0.01
0.86 0.80 0.94 0.00 0.00
0.33 0.21 0.74 0.28 0.34
DISC ? 1.29 0.04
3.62 0.01
0.01 0.01
PS  0.65 0.71 0.03 0.03
1.91 2.03 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
DISCBonus ? 0.54
1.72
0.02(continued on next page)



























Logistic Models Tobit Models
















ntercept ? 0.08 0.08
0.01 0.01
ikelihood ratio 278.44 233.59 283.14 328.63 276.65
-value 0.01 0.01 0.01
seudo R2 0.46 0.48 0.46
classified correctly 77.30 77.70 75.60
665 524 665 1330 1173
censored 665 602
hree values are reported for each covariate: the first value is the coefficient estimate; the second italicized value is the
dds ratio marginal effect for logistic tobit models; and the third value in parentheses is the two-tailed probability
alue.
he dependent variable in the columns headed “Logistic Models” is the logarithm of the odds of a repurchase. The
ependent variable in the columns headed “Tobit Models” is the aggregate amount including expenses spent repurchasing
hares during fiscal year t, scaled by lagged total assets. All variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase year.
arginal effects for the tobit models are equal to the probability of a no-limit observation multiplied by the coefficient
stimate and are evaluated at the mean of each covariate.
Variable Definitions:
NDISC  indicator variable taking the value of 1 when insufficient disclosure renders the presence
of an EPS target indeterminate, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one of the j compensation
components j  bonuses, options, or LTIPs linked to EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
NDISCj  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms that fail to explicitly disclose whether the
jth compensation element is conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
EPSj  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms where the jth compensation element is
conditional on EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
Surplus cash holdings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 where the residual from yearly optimal cash
holdings regressions is positive, and 0 otherwise see Table 2 for details;
Free cash flow  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with a market-to-book ratio less than the
sample median for the year and net operating cash flow greater than the sample median
for the year, and 0 otherwise;
Excess investing cash flow  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if investing cash flows are positive, and 0
otherwise;



























An Table 3 provide consistent evidence that EPS-based performance conditions in executive com-
ensation contracts are an important determinant of repurchase activity among U.K. firms.9
V. FURTHER ANALYSIS
While tests presented in the previous section establish an association between repurchase
ctivity and performance conditions applied in executive compensation contracts, they leave un-
esolved the more fundamental question of whether such a link is in shareholders’ best interests.
his section seeks evidence on the costs and benefits associated with compensation-driven repur-
hase activity. We begin by testing whether repurchasers with EPS targets exhibit weaker perfor-
ance lower payouts to shareholders as a consequence of management diverting funds from
rofitable investment opportunities regular dividends to fund repurchase activity. Next, we test
hether compensation-driven repurchases help to alleviate the problems of surplus cash, subop-
imally low leverage, market mispricing, and accrual manipulation.
ost-Repurchase Performance and Payouts
Bens et al. 2002 conclude that U.S. managers divert capital from positive NPV investments
o fund repurchases aimed at offsetting the dilutive impact of ESOs. If managers adopt the same
trategy to achieve EPS performance targets, then EPS-induced repurchases could represent a
erious cost for shareholders in the form of underinvestment. Accordingly, we examine whether a
igher probability of repurchases in the presence of EPS-based compensation arrangements is
ssociated with material underinvestment problems.
All else equal, failure to exploit profitable investment opportunities by channeling capital
rom positive NPV projects to fund repurchases should be reflected in inferior future performance.
ests reported in Table 4 compare the performance of repurchasers and nonrepurchasers using a
ifference-in-differences OLS specification in which the dependent variable is the change in
erformance from the pre- to the post-repurchase period. We estimate models for two alternative
erformance metrics: change in return on assets ∆ROA and change in market-adjusted stock
eturns ∆Returns. The vector of explanatory variables includes indicator variables for repurchas-
In supplementary tests we explored whether the propensity for repurchases is increasing in the number of compensation
elements linked explicitly to EPS. The indicator variable EPSSingle EPSMulti captures firm-years where one more than
one compensation element is tied to EPS. For conditional logistic regressions, coefficient estimates on EPSSingle and
EPSMulti are 0.60 and 0.79, respectively, and significant at the p 
 0.01 level. For tobit regressions, coefficient estimates
on both covariates are equal to 0.03 and statistically significant at the p 
 0.01 level. Results indicate that repurchases
are more likely for firms with single and multiple components of pay tied to EPS. However, tests fail to reject equality
of coefficient estimates in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient on EPS  EPS .
TABLE 3 (continued)
Market capitalization  share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;
Market-to-book  book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets;
Net leverage  total liabilities net of cash holdings divided by total assets net of cash holdings;
Dividend yield  ordinary dividends per share divided by share price;
Negative returns  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 12-month stock returns are less than the market
return over the corresponding period, and 0 otherwise;
Negative earnings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if reported EPS is negative, and 0 otherwise;
Options outstanding  aggregate number of outstanding options for all employees at the balance sheet date
scaled by market capitalization; and
Earnings-based target  indicator variable equal to 1 for firms where at least one of the j compensation components
is linked to any earnings-based metric including EPS, and 0 otherwise.Multi Single
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TTABLE 4
Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics for Difference-in-Differences OLS
Regressions of Change in Performance Relative to Repurchase Year t
ariable
∆Performance: Pre- to Post-Repurchase ∆Performance
∆ROA ∆Returns (t−1 to t+1) for:
t−1 to t+1 t−1 to t+2 t−1 to t+1 t−1 to t+2 ∆ROA ∆Returns
OA 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.04 0.32 0.17
0.01 0.01 0.04 0.63 0.01 0.05
egative earnings 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04
0.06 0.50 0.23 0.45 0.05 0.31
eturns 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.94 0.01 0.90
0.15 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.01
og(Total assets) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.37 0.47 0.01 0.17
Log(Total assets) 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.04 0.19
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
arket-to-book 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01
everage 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.13
0.78 0.14 0.19 0.71 0.78 0.14
orking capital 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.79 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.75 0.01
nvesting cash flow 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09
0.43 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.38 0.48
perating cash flow 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.05
0.01 0.48 0.87 0.94 0.01 0.75
ash holdings 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.04
0.35 0.07 0.88 0.06 0.39 0.73
ptions outstanding 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.39 0.42 0.01 0.94 0.61 0.01
epurchase 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.09
0.37 0.66 0.04 0.10
PS 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00
0.23 0.86 0.06 0.97
epurchase  EPS 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.04
0.29 0.43 0.14 0.56
epurchaseCash rich 0.04 0.12
0.16 0.29
epurchaseCash constrained 0.02 0.13
0.14 0.03
onrepurchaseCash rich 0.01 0.01
0.49 0.86
epurchaseCash rich EPS 0.05 0.07
0.09 0.54
epurchaseCash constrained EPS 0.03 0.10
0.03 0.12
onrepurchaseCash rich EPS 0.00 0.02
0.83 0.71


















Ars and firms with EPS-based performance conditions, respectively, the associated two-way inter-
ction effect, and a set of controls. Columns 2 and 3 4 and 5 in Table 4 report results for ∆ROA
∆Returns. Findings provide no evidence that repurchasers in general, or repurchases with EPS
onditions in particular, exhibit inferior post-repurchase performance. Estimated coefficients on
he Repurchase indicator variable are either insignificant in the ∆ROA models or positive in the
TABLE 4 (continued)
ariable
∆Performance: Pre- to Post-Repurchase ∆Performance
∆ROA ∆Returns (t−1 to t+1) for:
t−1 to t+1 t−1 to t+2 t−1 to t+1 t−1 to t+2 ∆ROA ∆Returns
ntercept 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.09
0.06 0.50 0.73 0.24 0.17 0.32
ndustry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ear effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
djusted R2 0.21 0.20 0.51 0.55 0.20 0.51
-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1178 930 1176 930 1178 1176
erformance is measured using return on assets ROA and 12-month market-adjusted stock returns Returns. Two-tailed
robability values are reported in parentheses. All explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase
ear unless otherwise indicated.
Variable Definitions:
∆ROA  change in operating earnings scaled by total assets;
∆Returns  change in 12-month stock returns ending on the fiscal year-end less the equally weighted
return on the FTSE All Share index over the corresponding period;
Repurchase  indicator variable equal to 1 for repurchasing firms, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one of the j compensation
components j  bonus plans, option plans, or LTIPs tied to EPS performance, and 0
otherwise;
Repurchasecash rich  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for repurchasing firms where either Surplus cash
holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 is equal to 1 at
time t−1, and 0 otherwise;
RepurchaseCash constrained  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for repurchasing firms where Surplus cash holdings,
Free cash flow, and Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 are equal to 0 at time t−1, and
0 otherwise;
NonrepurchaseCash rich  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for nonrepurchasing firms where either Surplus cash
holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 is equal to 1 at time
t−1, and 0 otherwise;
ROA  return on assets;
Negative earnings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms reporting a loss, and 0 otherwise;
Returns  12-month market-adjusted stock returns;
Log(total assets)  natural logarithm of total assets;
∆Log(total assets)  change in the natural logarithm of total assets over the same period as the dependent
variable is measured;
Market-to-book  book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets;
Leverage  total liabilities divided by total assets;
Working capital  change in noncash current assets minus liabilities scaled by total assets;
Investing cash flow  cash flow from investing activities scaled by total assets;
Operating cash flow  cash flow from operating activities scaled by total assets;
Cash holdings  cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets;
Options outstanding  aggregate number of outstanding options for all employees scaled by market capitalization;
Industry effects  vector of industry indicator variables based on Datastream level-3 classification; and















































Stock Repurchases and Executive Compensation Contract Design 721
TReturns models, while coefficient estimates on Repurchase  EPS are consistently insignificant.
ur findings do not support the view that EPS-based performance targets encourage management
o divert cash from positive NPV projects to fund buybacks.
The incentive to channel funds away from profitable investments to support repurchases may
e especially strong among the subset of firms with limited cash resources. Columns 6 and 7 in
able 4 extend the previous analysis by replacing Repurchase with the following three indicator
ariables to capture firms’ pre-repurchase cash characteristics: RepurchaseCash rich takes the value
f 1 for repurchasing firms where either Surplus cash holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing
ash flow from Table 3 equals 1 at time t−1, and 0 otherwise; RepurchaseCash constrained takes the
alue of 1 for repurchasing firms where Surplus cash holdings, Free cash flow, and Excess
nvesting cash flow equal 0 at time t−1, and 0 otherwise; and NonrepurchaseCash rich takes the
alue of 1 for nonrepurchasing firms where either Surplus cash holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess
nvesting cash flow equals 1 at time t−1, and 0 otherwise. All three indicators are also interacted
ith EPS to capture incremental effects associated with EPS-based compensation. Absent EPS
argets, cash-constrained repurchasers are associated with similar accounting performance column
 and superior market performance column 7 in the post-repurchase period relative to other
roups. Coefficient estimates on the RepurchaseCash constrained EPS interaction are either positive
∆ROA model or indistinguishable from 0 ∆Return model. Collectively, these findings provide
o evidence that cash-constrained repurchasers, as a group, are characterized by abnormally weak
uture performance, or that the subset of cash-constrained repurchasers with EPS conditions ex-
ibit incrementally worse performance.
Profitable investment opportunities are not the only source of funds for repurchases that could
mpose costs on shareholders. A second potentially costly source is regular dividend payments.
ecause dividends are sticky and dividend cuts are associated with significant stock price declines,
egular dividend payments represent a permanent commitment to distribute cash flows and, as
uch, serve as a disciplinary force on managers’ actions Easterbrook 1984. Repurchases, by
omparison, do not imply the same ongoing commitment and are therefore more suited to distrib-
ting transitory cash flow shocks Guay and Harford 2000; Jagannathan et al. 2000. Using cash
ows underpinning dividends to fund repurchases could therefore weaken monitoring through a
ower commitment to ongoing payouts. Alternatively, repurchases may be associated with in-
reased payouts to shareholders if they enable managers to disgorge lumpy cash surpluses in a
imely fashion alongside regular dividend payments.
We examine the impact of EPS-motivated repurchases on payouts to shareholders in two
ays. First, we model the annual change in total payouts dividends plus repurchases scaled by
agged total assets in the repurchase year using a difference-in-differences tobit regression. Ex-
lanatory variables include indicator variables for repurchasers and firms with EPS-based perfor-
ance conditions, the associated two-way interaction effect, and a vector of controls. Column 2 in
able 5 presents results estimated using the full sample. The Repurchase coefficient estimate is
ositive and significant, indicating that repurchasers experience higher payout increases in the
epurchase year. The estimated coefficient on Repurchase  EPS is not significant at conventional
evels; payout increases for repurchases with EPS-contingent compensation are indistinguishable
rom those exhibited by non-EPS repurchasers. These results do not support dividend substitution
laims for repurchasers in general and EPS-contingent repurchasers in particular. Instead, findings
uggest that dividends and repurchases represent complementary payout options that in conjunc-
ion yield higher payouts to shareholders regardless of whether repurchases are driven by EPS-
ontingent compensation arrangements.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 examine change in total payouts for firms with and without
urplus cash at time t−1, respectively. Results and conclusions are similar to those reported for the






























Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics for Pooled Regressions Relating
Payout Policy to Repurchase Activity and the Incidence of EPS-Based Performance
Conditions in Executive Compensation Contracts
ariable











urplus cash holdings 0.01 0.03
0.06 0.24
ree cash flow 0.01 0.06
0.10 0.02
xcess investing cash flow 0.01 0.06
0.05 0.04
og(Market capitalization) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.09 0.19 0.37 0.23
arket-to-book 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.01 0.57 0.92
et leverage 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.01 0.10 0.01 0.49
egative returns 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
0.92 0.49 0.07 0.16
egative earnings 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
0.05 0.07 0.03 0.91
ptions outstanding 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.99 0.88 0.54 0.01
ividend yield 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
0.51 0.96 0.49 0.89
OA 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03
0.01 0.01 0.08 0.66
ROA 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.08
0.05 0.07 0.17 0.22
epurchase 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.18
epurchase  EPS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06
0.30 0.36 0.72 0.10
ntercept 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.17
0.91 0.74 0.32 0.44
ndustry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ear effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ikelihood ratio 1370.16 1088.99 301.37
-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
djusted R2 0.04
1313 1053 260 1312
left-censored 214 161 53
wo-tailed probability values are reported in parentheses.
ll explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase year unless otherwise indicated.
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Tssociated with significantly larger payout increases for surplus cash flow repurchasers, there is no
uggestion of dividend substitution among low cash flow repurchasers with EPS-contingent com-
ensation column 4.
Our second test of whether EPS targets encourage managers to divert funds from regular
ividend increases to pay for repurchases focuses on dividend forecast errors, defined as the
bserved dividend change minus the expected dividend change. If repurchasers redirect funds
rom dividend payments to support repurchase activity, then we should observe lower-than-
xpected dividend increases in the repurchase year. We draw on Lintner’s 1956 model linking
urrent dividends to contemporaneous earnings and lagged dividend payments to estimate ex-
ected dividend changes for firm i in year t. Because we are unable to estimate firm-specific
egression parameters from Lintner’s 1956 model due to insufficient time-series data for earnings
nd dividends, we instead use a portfolio approach based on the following sequential sort proce-
ure. Each year all nonfinancial firms from Extel with available data are sorted into quintiles based
n contemporaneous earnings before exceptional items. Each annual earnings portfolio is then
urther sorted into quintile portfolios according to lagged ordinary dividends. Median annual
ividend changes for the resulting 25 earnings-lagged dividend portfolio combinations computed
fter excluding repurchasers serve as estimates of expected dividend changes. Dividend forecast
rrors are equal to the observed annual dividend change less the median dividend change for
rms’ corresponding earnings-lagged dividend portfolio in year t. Column 5 in Table 5 reports
oefficient estimates from an OLS regression of dividend forecast errors on the Repurchase indi-
ator variable, its corresponding interaction with EPS, and a vector of control variables. Although
he estimated coefficient on Repurchase is negative, as predicted by the dividend-substitution
ypothesis, it is not significant at conventional levels p  0.18. Further, the incremental effect
or repurchasers with EPS targets Repurchase  EPS is positive and marginally significant
TABLE 5 (continued)
Variable Definitions:
∆Total Payout  change in the aggregate value of dividends plus stock repurchases scaled by lagged total
assets over the period t−1 to t; tobit regression models for ∆Total Payout are estimated
using three samples: all firms with available data Full sample, observations where either
Surplus cash holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 are
equal to 1 at time t−1 Surplus Cash: Yes, and observations where Surplus cash holdings,
Free cash flow, and Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 are equal to 0 at time t−1
Surplus Cash: No; and
Dividend Forecast Error  unexpected dividend changes scaled by lagged market capitalization over the period t−1 to
t, computed using a portfolio-based application of Lintner’s 1956 model;
xplanatory Variable Definitions:
Repurchase  indicator variable equal to 1 for repurchasing firms, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one of the j compensation
components j  bonus plans, option plans, or LTIPs tied to EPS performance, and 0
otherwise;
∆ROA  change in operating earnings scaled by total assets;
Industry effects  vector of industry indicator variables based on Datastream level-3 classification; and
Year effects  vector of calendar year indicator variables.








































Ap  0.10. Overall, results do not support the view that EPS-contingent compensation arrange-
ents motivate firms to divert funds from ordinary dividend payments to support repurchases.10
fficient Contracting
Linking executive compensation to EPS growth provides management with a means of ma-
ipulating reported performance through repurchases that can easily be avoided by using alter-
ative accounting metrics such as ROA or growth in operating profit. Why EPS conditions remain
opular in executive compensation contracts despite the additional earnings management oppor-
unities such arrangements provide is, therefore, an intriguing question. One possibility is that EPS
onditions represent an efficient contracting device that helps align interests of managers and
hareholders by incentivizing managers to make decisions that promote shareholder value. Prior
esearch highlights several shareholder benefits associated with repurchases including limiting
verinvestment of surplus cash, increasing leverage in firms with inefficient capital structure, and
ignaling stock price undervaluation Dittmar 2000. Insofar as EPS targets create incentives to
anipulate reported performance by repurchasing stock, EPS-based compensation may provide
hareholders with a simple means of motivating executives to distribute surplus cash, increase
everage, and correct underpricing in a timely manner.
Table 6 presents models testing whether the positive association between repurchases and
ash is more pronounced for firms with EPS performance conditions in the presence of surplus
ash. We create an indicator variable, Surplus cash, taking the value of 1 where Surplus cash
oldings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing cash flow from Table 3 is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise.
e use Surplus cash to partition the sample before estimating separately for each partition a
ogistic left-censored tobit regression relating the probability scaled value of a repurchase to
tock and flow measures of cash and their associated interactions with EPS. Estimated coefficients
n the Cash holdings  EPS, CFO  EPS, and CFI  EPS interactions are positive and signifi-
ant in columns 3 and 4, where Surplus cash is equal to 1 except for Cash holdings  EPS in the
ogistic model. In contrast, only the CFO  EPS coefficient tobit model is positive and signifi-
ant in columns 5 and 6, where Surplus cash is equal to 0. On balance, these findings suggest that
PS targets benefit shareholders by creating a stronger link between repurchases and cash perfor-
ance in the presence of surplus cash.
Table 7 examines the intervening effect of low leverage and undervaluation on the link
etween repurchases and EPS targets. In Models 1 and 2, we estimate a version of Equation 1
elating the probability of a repurchase to the presence of EPS targets and an underleverage
ndicator variable. Underleverage takes the value of 1 when net leverage is less than the annual
edian value for the corresponding Datastream level-4 industry group computed using the Extel
opulation, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 includes Underleverage as a main effect, while Model 2
ncludes the Underleverage  EPS interaction. As predicted, estimated coefficients for the Un-
erleverage main effect are positive and significant in both models, as are the coefficients on EPS.
he Underleverage  EPS variable in Model 2, however, does not load p  0.93. Accordingly,
0 In supplementary tests we examined off-diagonal cases based on the predicted probabilities from a pooled version of
Model 1 in Table 3. We classified repurchasers with an implied probability ≤0.5 as “unexpected repurchasers” and
nonrepurchasers with an implied probability 0.5 as “unexpected nonrepurchasers.” We compared these cases with
observations where the model correctly predicts a repurchase firm is a repurchaser and the implied probability  0.5
and a nonrepurchase firm is a nonrepurchaser and the implied probability ≤0.5. We find no evidence that unexpected
repurchasers perform worse or make lower payouts than expected repurchasers. These results provide further evidence
that EPS-based compensation arrangements do not encourage firms to engage in inconsistently suboptimal repurchase
activity. On the other hand, there is some suggestion that unexpected nonrepurchasers perform worse than expected
nonrepurchasers, consistent with the view that failure to buy back shares in particular situations imposes agency costs
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TTABLE 6
Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics for Pooled Logistic (Left-Censored
Tobit) Regressions Relating the Probability (Scaled Value) of a Repurchase to the
Incidence of EPS-Based Performance Conditions in Executive Compensation Contracts,
Conditional on Surplus Cash
ariable Predicted Sign
Surplus Cash: Yes Surplus Cash: No
Logistic Tobit Logistic Tobit
ash holdings  3.63 0.11 0.30 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.68 0.54
FO  3.63 0.14 6.88 0.18
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
FI  1.34 0.03 6.20 0.14
0.01 0.04 0.09 0.08
og(Market capitalization) ? 0.07 0.00 0.52 0.01
0.12 0.10 0.01 0.01
arket-to-book  0.18 0.01 0.68 0.01
0.10 0.01 0.03 0.48
et leverage  1.57 0.02 0.38 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ividend yield ? 0.67 0.04 29.80 0.03
0.53 0.44 0.01 0.52
egative returns  0.05 0.00 0.40 0.02
0.75 0.89 0.31 0.18
egative earnings  1.14 0.04 1.13 0.02
0.01 0.01 0.12 0.32
ptions outstanding  0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01
0.06 0.35 0.77 0.47
DISC ? 1.23 0.03 2.27 0.07
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
PS  0.45 0.01 0.35 0.00
0.09 0.91 0.65 0.99
PS  Cash holdings  0.50 0.07 1.39 0.19
0.60 0.05 0.63 0.01
PS  CFO  2.55 0.10 6.00 0.19
0.06 0.05 0.13 0.05
PS  CFI  3.42 0.15 1.33 0.04
0.01 0.01 0.76 0.71
ntercept ? 0.02 0.04 4.09 0.09
0.96 0.01 0.01 0.01
ndustry Yes Yes Yes Yes
ear Yes Yes Yes Yes
ikelihood ratio 233.10 335.66 145.47 90.49
repurchasers/left-censored 553 516 112 149
seudo R2 0.26 0.57
classified correctly 64.50 69.70
1069 1069 261 261
wo tailed probability values are reported in parentheses.





























Ahile findings support claims that repurchases are a response to abnormally low leverage, there is
o evidence that EPS-based compensation arrangements amplify this effect.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 7 explore the link between equity undervaluation and EPS-motivated
epurchases. Our proxy for undervaluation compares observed price with intrinsic value estimated












here IV is intrinsic value for firm i four months after the beginning of repurchase year t, EF1 is
he last available I/B/E/S mean consensus forecast for one-year-ahead EPS during the window
300 days 
 t 
 120 days, P is observed stock price four months after the end of fiscal year t
1, J is the set of firms with consensus forecast data on I/B/E/S in the same Datastream level-3
ndustry as firm i i  J, and n is the number of firms in J. The indicator variable Undervaluation
akes the value of 1 where IVit−1  Pit−1, and 0 otherwise. Model 3 in Table 7 includes the
ndervaluation main effect, while Model 4 is expanded to include the Undervaluation  EPS
erm. As with all previous models, EPS loads with a statistically significant positive coefficient in
oth regressions. The Undervaluation main effect also loads positively in Model 3, suggesting that
epurchases are at least a partial response to market mispricing. However, Model 4 suggests this
ffect is driven by firms with EPS-based compensation conditions: the coefficient on Undervalu-
tion is indistinguishable from 0, whereas Undervaluation  EPS is positive and significant at the
0 percent level. The probability value for a likelihood ratio test comparing Models 3 and 4 is
.09. An indication of the economic significance of the interaction effect is provided by compar-
TABLE 6 (continued)
he sample is partitioned according to the presence or absence of surplus cash. Columns headed “Surplus Cash: Yes”
ontain observations where either the Surplus cash holdings, Free cash flow, or Excess investing cash flow indicator
ariables from Table 3 equals 1. Columns headed “Surplus Cash: No” contain observations where the Surplus cash
oldings, Free cash flow, and Excess investing cash flow indicator variables from Table 3 are equal to 0. In columns headed
Logistic” the dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of a repurchase. In the columns headed “Tobit” the
ependent variable is the aggregate amount including expenses spent repurchasing shares during fiscal year t, scaled by
agged total assets.
ll variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase year.
Explanatory Variable Definitions:
NDISC  indicator variable taking the value of 1 when insufficient disclosure renders the presence of an
EPS target indeterminate, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one of the j compensation
components j  bonuses, options, or LTIPs linked to EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
Cash holdings  cash and cash equivalents scaled by lagged total assets;
CFO  cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets;
CFI  cash flow from investing activities scaled by lagged total assets;
Market capitalization  share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;
Market-to-book  book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets;
Net leverage  total liabilities net of cash holdings divided by total assets net of cash holdings;
Dividend yield  ordinary dividends per share divided by share price;
Negative returns  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 12-month stock returns are less than the market
return over the corresponding period, and 0 otherwise;
Negative earnings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if reported EPS is negative, and 0 otherwise; and
Options outstanding  aggregate number of outstanding options for all employees at the balance sheet date scaled by
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TTABLE 7
Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics for Conditional Logistic Regressions
Examining the Intervening Effect of Underleverage and Undervaluation on the Association
between the Probability of a Repurchase and the Incidence of EPS-Based Performance





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
og(Market capitalization) ? 1.21 1.21 1.56 1.56
3.34 3.35 4.74 4.76
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
arket-to-book  0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67
0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
et leverage  0.37 0.41
0.69 0.66
0.10 0.07
ividend yield ? 0.90 0.90 0.65 0.65
2.45 2.45 1.92 1.91
0.33 0.33 0.57 0.57
egative returns  0.04 0.04
0.96 0.96
0.78 0.78
egative earnings  1.08 1.08 1.26 1.23
0.34 0.34 0.28 0.29
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ptions outstanding  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.98) (0.98) (1.01) (1.01)
0.12 0.12 0.75 0.71
urplus cash holdings  0.15 0.15 0.24 0.25
1.16 1.16 0.78 0.78
0.33 0.33 0.22 0.22
ree cash flow  0.63 0.63 0.52 0.53
1.87 1.87 1.67 1.69
0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
xcess investing cash flow  0.72 0.72 0.83 0.83
2.06 2.06 2.30 2.29
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
nderleverage  0.42 0.40
1.52 1.49
0.01 0.12
ndervaluation  0.76 0.10
2.13 1.11
0.01 0.83
DISC ? 1.46 1.46 1.70 1.85
4.33 4.33 5.46 6.36
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
PS  0.67 0.65 0.95 0.68
1.95 1.92 2.57 1.98
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03





























Ang the odds ratios for Undervaluation in the presence and absence of EPS-contingent contracts.11
he odds of repurchasing are no different than the odds of not repurchasing for undervalued firms
n the absence of EPS-contingent compensation e0.1 = 1.11. In contrast, the odds of a repurchase
re e0.1+0.79 = 2.44 times higher than the odds of not repurchasing for undervalued firms with
PS-contingent compensation. Results provide further albeit statistically weak evidence that
hareholders benefit from EPS-motivated repurchases in the form of higher buyback probability
hen stock price falls below intrinsic value.
Our final set of tests examines the interaction between stock repurchases and accrual man-
gement. Executives need not resort to repurchases to meet binding EPS targets. Prior research
ndicates that managers often use accounting accruals to maximize compensation payouts Healy
985. Although the choice between alternative earnings management instruments has not been
idely explored in the literature, several factors suggest that U.K. shareholders favor EPS man-
gement through repurchases over accruals. First, because shareholders benefit from repurchases
1 Direct interpretation of coefficient estimates and odds ratios reported for interaction terms is problematic in nonlinear
models since the effect depends on the contribution of the covariates Ai and Norton 2003. Comparing odds ratios for
the jth covariate in the presence and absence of the ith covariate provides a simple means of interpreting the economic






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PS  Underleverage  0.03
1.03
0.93
PS  Undervaluation  0.79
2.20
0.10
ikelihood ratio 267.44 268.17 207.81 210.56
-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
seudo R2 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.51
correctly classified 73.50 73.70 78.10 78.80
665 665 439 439
hree values are reported for each covariate: the first value is the coefficient estimate; the second italicized value is the
dds ratio; and the third value in parentheses is the two-tailed probability value.
he dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds of a repurchase. See Tables 2 and 3 for definitions of all remaining
ariables. All variables are measured at the beginning of the repurchase year.
Variable Definitions:
NDISC  indicator variable taking the value of 1 when insufficient disclosure renders the presence of an EPS
target indeterminate, and 0 otherwise;
EPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms with at least one of the j compensation components
j  bonus plans, option plans, or LTIPs tied to EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
Underleverage  indicator variable taking the value of 1 where net leverage is less than the annual median value for
the corresponding Datastream level-4 industry group, and 0 otherwise; and
Undervaluation  indicator variable taking the value of 1 where intrinsic value computed using a price-to-forward-earnings
multiple is greater than observed price on the valuation date four months after the beginning of the
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Tsee above, the net impact on shareholder wealth from managing EPS through this method is
ikely to be less detrimental than accruals, where the gains to shareholders are less obvious.
econd, the effect of repurchases on reported EPS is more transparent than accrual choices be-
ause U.K. firms must disclose details of all repurchase trades to the stock market without delay
nd report aggregate repurchase activity in their published financial statements. Investors are
herefore better placed to reverse the effect of repurchases on reported EPS, should they wish to do
o. Third, unlike accruals that reverse over time, buybacks raise the baseline EPS target perma-
ently and do not contribute to future earnings variability.12
If managing EPS through repurchases imposes lower net costs on shareholders relative to
ccrual manipulation, owners would benefit from compensation-driven buybacks via lower accrual
anipulation as executives substitute repurchases for discretionary accruals. We test this predic-
ion by regressing measures of absolute abnormal working capital accruals for the repurchase year
n an indicator variable for repurchasers with EPS targets Repurchase_EPS, the two-way inter-
ction capturing the incremental effect for repurchasers without EPS conditions Repurchase_EPS
NOEPS, and a vector of controls. We use the absolute value of abnormal accruals because our
rediction relates to the overall level of accrual management activity.13
Abnormal working capital accruals are estimated using two methods: the modified-Jones
odel Dechow et al. 1995 and the performance-matched model Kothari et al. 2005. We esti-
ate both models cross-sectionally using industry-year portfolios comprising all observations
rom Extel with available data. Results in Table 8 are consistent with lower abnormal accrual
ctivity for repurchasers with EPS-contingent compensation arrangements, relative to nonrepur-
hasers and repurchasers without EPS targets. The estimated coefficient on Repurchase_EPS is
egative and significant in all models, while the Repurchase_EPS  NOEPS coefficient is reliably
ositive and significant. These findings are consistent with the view that firms with EPS targets are
ore likely to manipulate reported EPS through repurchases as opposed to working capital accru-
ls. To the extent that manipulation via accruals imposes higher costs on shareholders, these
esults suggest an additional channel through which the positive association between repurchases
nd EPS-contingent compensation can benefit shareholders.
ummary
Results presented in this section suggest net benefits to shareholders from stock repurchases
otivated by EPS targets in executive compensation contracts. Repurchasers are associated with
arger increases in total payouts, and this effect is no less pronounced for repurchasers with EPS
argets, suggesting that dividend substitution is not a first-order concern. Further, the positive link
etween repurchases and cash performance is more prominent for firms with EPS targets in the
resence of surplus cash; undervalued firms with EPS conditions are more likely to signal their
2 Managers may also favor repurchases over accruals as a means of inflating EPS for several reasons. First, because stock
market investors typically view repurchases favorably, they are less likely to question executives’ underlying repur-
chases motives. Second, executives can provide convincing, non-manipulation-based explanations to support their
actions if challenged by shareholders.
3 Using a levels approach to model absolute abnormal accruals introduces the risk of spurious correlation. Our results and
conclusions should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. Several factors militate against using a changes specification
however. First, accrual reversals confound a changes specification: absolute abnormal accrual levels may remain similar
over short intervals even when the level of accrual management declines because high absolute accruals capture both
contemporaneous accrual management and unwinding of accrual management from previous periods. Second, if firms
use repurchases instead of accruals in response to a new stimulus for EPS manipulation, then absolute accruals will
remain constant over time and a changes specification will yield null results. Consistent with these arguments, when we
model the change in absolute accruals we find no difference between repurchasers with EPS conditions, repurchasers



























Coefficient Estimates and Model Summary Statistics from Pooled OLS Regressions





Absolute Abnormal Accruals Computed
Using:
DSS Model KLW Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
og(Total assets) ? 0.00 0.00
0.19 0.04
arket-to-book ? 0.00 0.00
0.29 0.14
et leverage  0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01
egative earnings  0.01 0.01
0.14 0.52
ptions outstanding  0.00 0.00
0.24 0.11
Operating cash flow  0.18 0.20
0.01 0.01
agged absolute accruals  0.05 0.05
0.01 0.01
epurchase_EPS  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
epurchase_EPS  NOEPS  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
ntercept ? 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ndustry No Yes No Yes
ear No Yes No Yes
djusted-R2 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07
-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1314 1312 1314 1312
repurchasers 656 654 656 654
wo-tailed probability values are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal
orking capital accruals, where abnormal accruals are the residual from either the Dechow et al. 1995 working capital
ccrual model DDS or the Kothari et al. 2005 working capital accrual model KLW. Both accrual models are estimated
ross-sectionally for all industry-year combinations.
ll variables relate to repurchase year t.
Variable Definitions:
Repurchase_EPS  indicator variable equal to 1 for repurchasing firms with at least one of the j compensation
components j  bonus plans, option plans, or LTIPs tied to EPS performance, and 0
otherwise;
NOEPS  indicator variable taking the value of 1 for firms that do not have at least one of the j
compensation components tied to EPS performance, and 0 otherwise;
Total assets  balance sheet value of aggregate assets;
Market-to-book  book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by total assets;
Net leverage  total liabilities net of cash holdings divided by total assets net of cash holdings;(continued on next page)
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Tndervaluation through a repurchase; and repurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with
ower abnormal accruals. We find no evidence that EPS-driven repurchases impose costs on
hareholders in the form of investment myopia.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the impact on firms’ stock repurchase activity of EPS performance
onditions in executive compensation contracts. Our analysis connects three distinct literatures.
ne body of research demonstrates how aspects of corporate payout policy are sensitive to ex-
cutives’ compensation arrangements. Another body of work based on surveys and anecdotal
vidence indicates that managers are sensitive to the EPS impact of repurchases. A third group of
tudies concludes that managers use repurchases to achieve key EPS performance thresholds. Our
nalysis integrates these three literatures by examining how repurchase policy is shaped by con-
ractual arrangements that create an explicit link between executive compensation and reported
PS.
We find that EPS targets explain firm-level repurchase policy after controlling for traditional
eterminants of buybacks. Further analysis reveals that EPS-motivated repurchases yield net ben-
fits to shareholders. Contrary to Bens et al. 2002, we find no evidence that EPS-driven repur-
hases lead to investment myopia. Instead, repurchasers are associated with larger payout in-
reases to shareholders that partly reflect a more pronounced link between repurchases and cash
erformance for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus cash flow. In addition, under-
alued firms with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a repurchase, and
epurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal accrual activity.
With repurchases emerging as a key payout mechanism in many jurisdictions and in view of
oncerns about the motives underlying this trend Bens et al. 2002; Bens et al. 2003; Hribar et al.
006; Marquardt et al. 2009, a better understanding of the contractual incentives driving repur-
hase activity and their associated economic consequences is appropriate. Our findings reveal
ignificant contracting benefits from the repurchase incentives that result from linking executive
ompensation to EPS. In particular, we identify stock repurchases as a potentially important
enefit of EPS-based targets in executive compensation contracts that improves alignment of
anagers’ and shareholders’ interests. This insight is consistent with Huang et al. 2010 who find
hat EPS-based bonus plans help to address agency conflicts between managers and shareholders
n the form of ownership dilution. We therefore provide a modest further step toward a more
omplete understanding of the costs and benefits associated with per-share-based performance
easures in general, and in particular why EPS-based targets remain a popular choice in executive
ompensation contracts despite their obvious limitations.
TABLE 8 (continued)
Negative earnings  indicator variable taking the value of 1 if reported earnings per share are negative, and 0
otherwise;
Options outstanding  aggregate number of outstanding options for all employees at the balance sheet date scaled by
market capitalization;
Operating Cash flow  standard deviation of operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets computed over the
three-year period centered on year t;
Lagged accruals  one-year lagged value of the dependent variable;
Industry  vector of industry indicator variables based on Datastream level-3 classification; and
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